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Abstract 
When directed to ignore evidence of a witness’ previous bad character because of a violation 
of the rules of evidence, are jurors’ beliefs still affected? The intuition is that they will be 
because in everyday argumentation, fallacies, like the ad hominem, are effective 
argumentative strategies. An ad hominem argument (against the person) undermines a 
conclusion by questioning the character of the proposer. This intuition divides current 
theories of argumentation. According to pragmadialectical theory (e.g., Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004) procedural rules exactly like the rules of evidence are part of our 
cognitive resources for evaluating arguments. If one of these rules is violated, an argument 
should be treated as a fallacy and so it should not alter someone’s belief in the conclusion. 
Some recent experiments investigating how reasonable these arguments are perceived to be 
seem to support this account (Van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meufells, 2009). These experiments 
are critiqued from the perspective of the relevance (Walton, 2008, 2009) and epistemic (Hahn 
& Oaksford, 2006, 2007; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004) approaches to argumentation. An 
experiment investigates the predictions of these approaches for a graded belief change 
version of Van Eemeren et al.’s (2009) experiment and the results are modelled using a 
Bayesian congruent prior model. These results cannot be explained by the pragmadialectical 
approach and show that in everyday argument people are extremely sensitive to the epistemic 
relevance of evidence. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that this can be switched off in 
more formal contexts such as the courtroom. 
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In the court room, many factors affect how persuasive jurors find the arguments put forward 
by counsel (Spellman & Schauer, 2012). The arguments presented in court are constrained by 
strict procedural rules about, for example, admissible evidence, not asking leading questions 
and so on. These procedural rules guarantee the quality of the arguments and evidence. 
However, lawyers occasionally violate these rules, intentionally or unintentionally, in order to 
influence the jury. For example, counsel may introduce evidence of a witness’ previous bad 
character, e.g., media reports of drunkenness or wife abuse. In the US, under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (2014) this may be inadmissible as irrelevant hearsay but only if the 
opposing counsel objects will the judge rule on its admissibility. At this point, she can inform 
the jury that the rules of evidence have been violated and direct them to ignore the evidence. 
 The goal of the arguments put forward in court is to bring about quantitative changes 
in jurors’ degrees of belief, ultimately, in the guilt or innocence of the defendant. When the 
judge points out that an argument, e.g., the witness abused his wife, violates a rule of 
evidence does this affect jurors’ degrees of belief in the conclusions they are asked to 
evaluate? Pointing out the violation is intended to remove any effect of the argument on 
jurors’ degrees of belief. However, once the argument has been introduced this seems an 
unrealistic expectation (Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & McWhethy, 2006).
 1
 Perhaps the most 
that can be hoped for by pointing out the violation is that the argument will carry less weight 
than it would have done had it been made without violating the rules of evidence.  
                                                          
1
 This study is a meta-analysis of the effects of directing jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence, especially in 
mock jury studies. There is considerable doubt about the success of such attempts (Steblay, et al., 2006, p 470):  
 “Eichhorn (1989) reports that “the effectiveness of instructions to disregard evidence has 
historically been met with skepticism” (p. 342), and quotes Judge Learned Hand, who described 
such instructions to be “recommendation[s] to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, 
not only their powers, but anybody’s else” (Nash v. United States, 1932, p. 1007).” 
Steblay et al. (2006, p. 489) conclude that their meta-analysis is consistent with the view that “…jurors are 
likely to have difﬁculty ignoring inadmissible evidence, even with a judicial admonition to do so.” 
 
 
4 
 
An explanation of this intuition is that in everyday argument outside the courtroom 
people are highly sensitive to evidence relevant to the reliability of testimony. Most of what 
people know is learnt from the testimony of others rather than from direct experience and 
children are very sensitive to factors, like the status of an informant (peer vs. teacher), that 
can affect reliability (Harris, 2012). Consequently, it may be difficult to ignore evidence that 
is treated as relevant in everyday argument when instructed to do so in the formal setting of 
the courtroom.  
While we would contend that this explanation is intuitively correct, it does divide 
current theories of argumentation. One current theory proposes that procedural rules exactly 
like the rules of evidence are part of our cognitive resources that we use to evaluate 
arguments. This approach is the pragmadialectical approach (e.g., Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004). These rules apply at different stages of an argument.  Just as the rule of 
evidence dismissing inadmissible evidence of bad character may not apply during the stage in 
proceedings when character witnesses are called. If one of these rules is violated, an 
argument should be treated as a fallacy and so it should not alter someone’s belief in the 
conclusion. Some recent experiments investigating how reasonable these arguments are 
perceived to be in everyday contexts (scientific, political, domestic) seem to support this 
account (Van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meufells, 2009). In this paper, we critique these 
experiments from the perspective of the relevance (Walton, 2008, 2009) and epistemic (Hahn 
& Oaksford, 2006, 2007; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004) approaches to argumentation. We 
investigate the predictions of these approaches for a graded belief change version of Van 
Eemeren et al.’s (2009) experiment and model our results using a Bayesian congruent prior 
model. These results cannot be explained by the pragmadialectical approach and show that in 
everyday argument people are extremely sensitive to the epistemic relevance of evidence. 
5 
 
Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that this can be switched off in more formal contexts such 
as the courtroom. 
 The argument form we introduced in the first paragraph was the argument ad 
hominem, i.e., the attempt to discount someone’s testimony on the grounds of their previous 
bad behaviour. We now introduce this argument form, which we used in our experiment, and 
the theories that have been put forward to explain when it is acceptable. 
 
Theories of Argumentation and the Argument ad Hominem 
Consistent with the courtroom situation,  
“Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or 
decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for a listener or reader, by 
putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the 
standpoint before a “rational judge.” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck 
Henkemans, 1996, p. 5).
2
 
This definition applies to the critical discussion in which rationality is relevant. There are 
other kinds of argument, like a quarrel, in which rationality, largely, goes out the window. In 
this paper, we will be solely concerned with the critical discussion.  
The attempt to undermine the credibility of a witness by pointing out their previous 
bad character is an instance of the argument ad hominem, i.e., the argument against the 
person, which is widely regarded as an argumentative fallacy. In this paper, we concentrate 
on this informal argument form. There are three forms of the ad hominem argument and we 
used all three in comprehensively testing our intuition about why people seem unable to 
ignore evidence of this type. 
 
                                                          
2
 For further elaboration of the concept of argumentation in informal reasoning, see Hitchcock (2006). 
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Ad Hominem Argument Forms 
Walton (2000, 2009), who has carried out the definitive work on the ad hominem, defines 
three forms of this fallacy.  He defines, “An ad hominem argument [as] the use of personal 
attack in a dialogue exchange between two parties, where the one party attacks the character 
of the other party as bad, in some respect…” (Walton, 2000, p. 102). Walton (2000) provides 
the following examples of the different forms of the ad hominem.  
The abusive ad hominem. (1) is an example of the abusive form of the ad hominem, 
where B is arguing against the advice D has given to A:
3
 
(1)   B: Person D knows nothing about cars. 
Therefore, D’s argument that you (A) should buy a Ford should not be 
accepted.  
Accusing someone of lack of knowledge without further substantiation is potentially abusive. 
It implies D is of bad character because if D knows nothing about cars she should not be 
offering advice on which car to buy.  
The circumstantial ad hominem. (2) is an example of the circumstantial ad 
hominem: 
 (2)  Person D advocates using company X because it is the best. 
D has married the daughter of the CEO of X and so may not be 
objective about X being the best. 
Therefore D is a bad person. 
Therefore D's argument for employing X should not be accepted. 
Here there is circumstantial evidence that D would advocate this argument even if he didn’t 
personally believe it.  
                                                          
3
 We use the letters A, B, and D, to denote discourse partners (A and B) or the source of the argument (D) to 
which A and B refer. This is because throughout the paper, we use C to denote the conclusion in dispute. 
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The tu quoque. The third form, is the tu quoque (you too) ad hominem, which is a 
special case of the circumstantial which involves D (not) carrying out exactly the actions that 
he is advocating other people should (not) carry out, e.g., 
(3)  Person D advocates not smoking. 
D smokes himself and so cannot be personally committed to not 
smoking. 
Therefore D is a bad person. 
Therefore D’s argument for not smoking should not be accepted. 
 
Logic and the Ad Hominem 
The ad hominem argument, in all its guises, is widely regarded as an informal reasoning 
fallacy because there is no logical relation between someone’s character and the arguments 
they put forward (e.g., Copi & Burgess- Jackson, 1996). For example, you may get better 
advice about the best car to buy from a criminal getaway driver than a car salesman. This lack 
of a logical relation between evidence and the character of the witness providing it motivates 
some of the rules of evidence. In many logic text books, at least since Hamblin (1970), it has 
been observed that there are many non-fallacious instances of informal fallacies such as the 
ad hominem. However, logic cannot provide an analysis of why one instance of the ad 
hominem is acceptable but another is not.   
 
Theoretical Approaches to the Ad Hominem 
Logic provides a normative theory of the relationship between the premises and conclusion of 
an argument which can distinguish when an argument is valid, i.e., when it logically follows 
from the premises by the laws of logic. Theories of informal argumentation attempt to 
provide a normative theory that can distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable uses of 
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informal reasoning fallacies. We recently reviewed two of these normative theories, the 
procedural and epistemic approaches (Hahn & Oaksford, 2012).  Here we also consider the 
relevance approach specifically to the argument ad hominem (Walton, 2008, 2009) 
Procedural approaches. As we mentioned in the introduction, procedural 
approaches, such as pragma-dialectical theory (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004), provide 
procedural rules of engagement in a critical discussion like the rules of evidence in the 
courtroom on which these theories are partly based. When the judge observes that a rule of 
evidence has been violated jurors should treat the argument as a fallacy and reject it in an all 
or nothing way just as logical arguments are valid or not. But this will depend on the stage in 
the proceedings. Counsel may employ exactly the same arguments non-fallaciously, should 
character witnesses be called. At this stage in proceedings it is perfectly appropriate to rebut 
positive arguments for someone’s character by appeal to evidence of previous bad character.   
According to the pragmadialectical approach (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004), 
the ad hominem is a fallacy when using it violates the freedom rule that “discussants may not 
prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question” 
(Van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meufells, 2009, p. 21). This rule can only be violated at the 
confrontation stage of an argument when the parties in a critical discussion are agreeing on 
the point of contention between them. In (1), according to Van Eemeren et al. (2009), if 
person B simply dismisses D’s introduction of whether someone should buy a Ford by using 
the abusive ad hominem, the discussion is effectively de-railed and no resolution of the issue 
can be forthcoming. On the other hand, if in the subsequent argumentative stage A is 
appealing to D as an authority on cars, it is appropriate for B to rebut this argument from 
authority by using (1). In a series of experiments, Van Eemeren et al. (2009, 2012) compared 
a control argument, where the freedom rule was not violated with the ad hominem arguments. 
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They found that the ad hominem arguments were always treated as less reasonable than the 
control.  
Van Eemeren et al. (2009) used a graded reasonableness scale as the dependent 
variable. This scale should not be confused with the colloquial use of “reasonable”, as in “a 
reasonable man” which may admit of degrees. Reasonableness was interpreted as conformity 
to the rules of pragmadialectical theory by analogy with logical validity and like logical 
validity this is an all or nothing, not a graded concept. However, Van Eemeren et al. (2009) 
observed a range of graded effects not consistent with this interpretation of reasonableness. 
The use of similar scales has been criticised (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007) in the study of circular 
reasoning where again graded effects were observed (Rips, 2002). As for circular reasoning, 
Van Eemeren et al.’s (2009) observation of graded effects provides evidence that more is 
going on here than evaluating whether the freedom rule has been violated or not. 
Relevance. Walton (2008, 2009) analyses the ad hominem as a fallacy of relevance. 
He argues that one of the key questions one must ask about, e.g., (1) above, is, “is the 
issue of character relevant in the type of dialogue in which the argument was used?” (Walton 
2008, p. 4). We can immediately see the issue at stake by considering the stage in 
proceedings in the courtroom example. The reason why there is a procedural rule discounting 
testimony about the witness’ character is because at most stages of the proceedings it is 
irrelevant. However, when character witnesses are called it is directly relevant to rebut 
arguments for someone’s good character by appeal to evidence of previous bad character. In 
formal settings like the courtroom the procedural rule is there to enforce the principle that 
evidence is only admitted when it is relevant. That is, relevance comes first. 
This proposal raises the possibility is that at least some pragmadialectical rules of 
engagement may be confounded with relevance. An immediate example comes from the 
control condition in Van Eemeren et al. (2009), which apparently defines the argumentative 
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stage of an argument where the freedom rule is not violated. (4) is an slight adaption to the 
format used in this experiment but in all essential details it is the same as in Van Eemeren et 
al. (2009). 
(4)  Person A – “I believe him (D) when he asserts there is nothing to be remarked 
about his integrity as a scientist; he has always performed research in an 
honest and sound manner.” 
Person B – “Do you really believe that? Twice now it has been apparent that 
he has fiddled with the results of his research.” 
In (4), it is clear that the conclusion in question directly concerns D’s integrity to which his 
previous misbehaviour is directly relevant. This factor clearly distinguishes (4) from (1) to (3) 
where the relevance of D’s bad character is less direct. It is also clear that nothing about (4) 
marks it out as at the argumentative stage in contrast to (1) to (3) which are supposedly at the 
confrontational stage in an argumentative dialogue. As we have observed before for other 
argument forms (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Hahn, 2013), (4) seems like a better 
argument than (1) – (3) completely regardless of the stage of the argument. 
We conjecture that any attempt to operationalise the pragmadialectical conception of 
when the freedom rule is not violated may be doomed to be conflated with when evidence is 
relevant. This is because procedural rules in formal contexts, i.e., the courtroom, are 
introduced precisely to ensure that jurors are only presented with evidence that is relevant in 
the current stage of the proceedings and not at stages where it is irrelevant. However, we 
doubt that the cognitive system employs such rules in everyday argumentation, rather than 
directly assess relevance. As we suggested in the introduction, this may be why people ignore 
the judge’s direction to ignore evidence that violates a rule of evidence: people carry over to 
the courtroom their everyday argumentative strategy based on relevance. 
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Walton is using “relevant” to mean epistemic relevance to changing our beliefs. This 
point is embodied in a second question which, according to Walton (2008, p. 4) we need to 
ask, i.e., is the argument that the conclusion (i.e., A should buy a Ford) should be dismissed 
outright or simply that our belief in this proposition should be assigned a reduced credibility 
against the background of other evidence for this proposition.  The epistemic approach to 
which we now turn provides a normative account of how credibility should vary in response 
to evidence.  
Epistemic approaches. Epistemic approaches suggest that the acceptability of a 
fallacy is a matter of degree which depends on content and which is predictable using Bayes’ 
rule (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007, 2012; Korb, 2004; Oaksford & Hahn, 2004; Zenker, 2013). 
People’s quantitative changes in degrees of belief in a conclusion, C, bought about by an 
argument, a, is treated as Bayesian inference using Bayes’ rule: 
Pr(𝐶|𝑎) =  
Pr(𝑎|𝐶) . Pr (𝐶)
Pr(𝑎|𝐶) . Pr(𝐶) + Pr(𝑎|¬𝐶) . Pr (¬𝐶)
 
That is, the posterior degree of belief in the conclusion given the argument, Pr(C|a), is a 
function of the likelihoods, Pr(a|C) and Pr(a|¬C), and the prior, Pr(C). There are two 
measures of interest, argument strength, i.e., the posterior (Pr(C|a)), and argument force, i.e., 
the change in degree of belief from prior to posterior, Pr(C|a) – Pr(C) (Hahn & Oaksford, 
2007) which can also be indexed by the likelihood ratio, Pr(a|C)/Pr(a|¬C).  
The Bayesian approach to the ad hominen depends on the observation that most of 
what we know comes from testimony (Spellman & Tenney, 2010) and consequently the 
reliability of the source should affect our degrees of belief (Harris, Hsu, & Madsen, 2012; 
Oaksford & Hahn, 2013). The abusive ad hominem in (1) suggests that A’s informant D is not 
a reliable source of information about cars and so A should downgrade his degree of belief in 
her testimony. So the Bayesian approach predicts graded effects dependent on content and 
12 
 
not an all or nothing endorse or not endorse prediction based on whether the freedom rule is 
violated or not.  
Together the relevance and epistemic approaches make some general predictions for 
when participants are asked to evaluate Person A’s degree of belief in the conclusion before 
(Prior) and after (Posterior) hearing Person B’s argument. First, they predict that peoples’ 
degree of belief in the conclusion should fall between prior and posterior dependent on how 
epistemically relevant B’s assertion of D’s bad character is to the conclusion. Second, the 
difference between prior and posterior should be greater in control conditions such as (4) 
where B’s assertion of D’s bad character is directly relevant to the conclusion. The 
pragmadialectical approach cannot make these predictions because controls like (4) provide 
no manipulation of the stage of argumentative discourse, i.e., they do not establish that the 
stage of the argument is the argumentative stage (see controls, in Materials in the 
Supplemental Materials available on-line). If we observe similar effects using controls like 
(4) this can only because the argument in the controls is more directly relevant to the 
conclusion than for the ad hominem arguments. Moreover, the epistemic approach should be 
able to provide a quantitative Bayesian model of the results. We now flesh out the details 
both of these predictions and of the Bayesian model. 
 
Introduction to the Current Experiment 
In this experiment, participants were presented with arguments like (5), derived from Van 
Eemeren et al. (2009): 
(5)  Person A – “I agree with him when he says that you have acted extremely 
unethically, you did not tell your patients in advance what they would be 
exposed to.” 
Person B – “What does he know about ethics? He is not a Doctor at all.” 
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We used a third person argument evaluation paradigm where participants rate the 
degree of belief person A would have in a conclusion (you have acted extremely unethically) 
before and after hearing Person B’s argument. We used this paradigm because we did not 
want to confound participants’ own prior beliefs with those of A.  We have shown in other 
work that using these third person judgements successfully dissociates participants’ 
assessments of the beliefs of an interlocutor in the experimental dialogues from their own 
prior beliefs (Karaslaan, Hohenberger, Demir, & Oaksford, 2014).
4
 
 
Experimental Hypotheses 
We now outline the specific hypotheses we tested which are based on Van Eemeren et al 
(2009, 2012) materials. They investigated three specific predictions for reasonableness 
judgements, which we reframe in testing the predictions of the relevance and epistemic 
approaches for their effects on belief change: 
1. All the ad hominem arguments should be less reasonable than the control, in 
which the freedom rule is not violated (see, Procedural approaches). 
In the controls we used, B’s assertion of D’s bad character is directly relevant to the 
conclusion and there is no intimation that the argument is in the argumetation stage where the 
freedom rule is not violated. Consequently, the prediction we tested was: 
1'.  All the ad hominem arguments should lead to a smaller decrease in degree of 
belief than the control. 
This hypothesis is directly analogous to the court room scenario as we now show by outlining 
the forms of both arguments: 
After hearing the witnesses (D’s) testimony the jury (A) believes the conclusion, C, to 
degree x (BelA(C) = x).  
                                                          
4
 Participants were asked to make a first person evaluation of the degree to which they believe the conclusion 
four days before the actual experiment (Karaslaan, Hohenberger, Demir, & Oaksford, 2014). No correlation was 
found between the participants’ own priors and their subsequent assessments of A’s initial prior.   
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After hearing counsel’s (B’s) argument (a) that the witness (D ) is of bad character, 
the jury (A) should revise their degree of belief to degree y (BelA(C|a) = y), such that, 
a. If a is not directly relevant to C , y < x 
b. If a is directly relevant to C, y << x 
On the relevance/epistemic approach y is still expected be significantly lower than x for the 
ad hominem arguments (a.) but the difference should be less than when the argument is 
directly relevant (b.). For these materials, the pragmadialectical approach can make no 
predictions as the stage of the argumentative dialogue was not manipulated.  
Pragmadialectical theory invokes elements of conversational pragmatics in providing 
a theory of argumentation. In particular, van Eemeren et al. (2009) argued that politeness 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987; Leech, 1983) may be a confounding factor. This factor might 
account for variation in judgements of reasonableness, which led to van Eemeren et al.’s 
(2009) second and third predictions. We take issue with these predictions arguing again that 
what differences there are will be based on epistemic relevance rather than politeness. 
2. Conversational pragmatics, here politeness, predicts an ordering in 
reasonableness such that abusive < circumstantial < tu quoque. 
The colloquial notion of being reasonable seems to subsume being polite. The abusive ad 
hominem in particular may be felt to be impolite and so less reasonable in this sense. 
However, in (5) politeness seems to have little to do with whether A should discount her 
degree of belief that B has behaved unethically. Her initial informant’s (D) status, i.e., Doctor 
or not, does seem relevant to D’s reliability as a source of information on this topic. The 
other two ad hominem arguments seem even more relevant. The tu quoque suggests that the 
informant is being hypocritical, e.g., a Doctor who smokes advising others to quit. The 
circumstantial suggests the informant has a conflict of interest, e.g., a Doctor who advises 
people to take a particular drug who is married to the CEO of the drug company that 
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manufactures it. Whether D is being hypocritical or has a conflict of interest seems highly 
relevant to whether A should accept his/her testimony.  These factors affect D’s reliability as 
a source of information.  Consequently, we see no reason a priori for why politeness predicts 
this ordering. Any differences are more likely to be related to how relevant in context a 
particular argument is to discounting D’s testimony as deriving from an unreliable source. 
Consequently, we would predict that the circumstantial and tu quoque would be regarded as 
stronger arguments than the abusive. We report results of testing this suggestion in the 
Results section.  
 As we mentioned in the introduction, Van Eemeren et al. (2009) used three different 
contexts in their experiment. These were used to rule out a general politeness explanation of 
the results.  
3. People should regard fallacies in a scientific discussion to be less reasonable 
than in the other two discussion contexts.  
As the paradigmatic example of a critical discussion in which rationality is paramount, they 
argued that the use of argumentative fallacies in a scientific context should be regarded as 
less reasonable than in the domestic and political contexts. Moreover, if the ad hominem is 
regarded as less reasonable in the science context, this cannot have anything to do with 
politeness. The corresponding prediction in the current experiment is that argument force 
should be lower for the fallacies in the scientific context compared to the other two contexts. 
With respect to the reliability of a source we suspect that context will have more 
nuanced effects. Relevance predicts that the main effects (2 & 3) are modified by an 
interaction between ad hominem argument type and context. For example, conflicts of 
interest seem particularly relevant in a scientific context. Intuitively, we would discount the 
opinion of a scientist who works for a drugs company relative to an independent University 
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research centre because of the obvious potential for a conflict of interest. Thus we predict 
that, 
3'.  In the scientific context the circumstantial ad hominem will lead to the 
greatest change in belief. 
In a political context, hypocrisy, saying one thing and doing another, would be highly 
relevant to whether one trusts what a politician says. Consequently, an obvious prediction 
based on epistemic relevance is that,  
3''.  In the political context the tu quoque ad hominem will lead to the greatest 
change in belief. 
 
A Bayesian Approach to Data Analysis and Modelling 
We used Bayesian statistics in this paper to avoid the pitfalls of Null Hypothesis Significance 
Testing (NHST).The NHST approach traditionally used in psychology to analyse data 
presents a variety of problems (e.g., Cumming, 2014; Kruschke, 2010). For example, p values 
are not uniquely defined for any particular data set. Moreover, being based on p values, the 
confidence intervals that we can attribute to parameter estimates are ill-defined. There are a 
variety of recommendations for surmounting these problems for the integrity of 
psychological research (e.g., Cumming, 2014; Kruschke, 2010). Here we adopt the Bayesian 
approach (Kruschke, 2010, 2011, 2013), which allows us to provide a statistical model 
appropriate to the data and compute the posterior probabilities of relevant parameters that can 
be used to test any hypothesis about the data in which we are interested (Kruschke, 2010).  
The rating scale was converted to the 0 – 1 probability scale. The appropriate 
distribution for summarising data on this scale is a Beta distribution, Beta(α, β).5 As the 
parameters of the distribution, α and β, are unknown they are estimated from the data by 
                                                          
5
 See Figure 3 for example Beta density functions for the prior and posterior judgements participants were asked 
to make in the experiment we report below. 
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Bayesian inference by first assigning appropriate prior distributions to the unknown 
parameters. As α and β can only take on positive, real values an uninformative Gamma 
distribution is appropriate. In this experiment there were 3 × 4 cells in the design and two 
measures were taken for each and so 48 parameters needed to be estimated in the full 
descriptive model. The posterior values of these parameters can be computed using 
hierarchical Bayesian modelling implemented in R (R Development Core Team, 2008) using 
the JAGs software (Plummer, 2003).  
In a previous model (Oaksford & Hahn, 2013) we modelled probabilities as point 
values. Here we adopt a distributional approach.  In the Results section, this approach will 
enable us in to derive an explanatory model as a simple modification of the descriptive 
Bayesian model we used to analyse the data.   
 
Method 
Participants 
The sample of 142 participants were recruited on-line via the departmental sign up system or 
by the experimenters and all carried out the experiment on SurveyMonkey (76 females, 66 
males; mean age = 29.83 yrs, SD = 11.18; 21.1% White British, 19% Asian British, 11.3% 
Black British, 11.3% Black non-British, 11.3% Asian non-British, 7.7% White non-British, 
18.3% Other). 
 Prospective Bayesian power analysis was used to determine the sample size 
(Kruschke, 2013; Meredith, 2014).  The results of a previous experiment using pro and con 
versions of the ad hominem were used in this analysis (Oaksford & Hahn, 2013). The 
difference between degree of belief before and after hearing the argument in the strong prior 
belief, con-argument (i.e., against the conclusion) condition was used to generate simulated 
data with mean = -0.19, SD = 0.18 and N = 32.  A region of practical equivalence (ROPE) 
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was set to a large effect size of .5 SD units, i.e., the goal was to have sufficient power to see 
large effects. This analysis indicated that a sample size of 140 would provide a .92 (credible 
interval = .87 to .97) probability that the 95% HDI for the effect size would fall outside a .5 
SD ROPE.  
 
Design and Materials 
The same materials used by Van Eemeren et al (2009) but adapted to a belief change format 
were used. As we have seen, these materials consisted of the three argument forms plus a 
control crossed with three different contexts, i.e., scientific, political and domestic (full 
details are in Materials in the Supplemental Materials available on-line).  In our scenarios, 
there are always three parties in the discussion. The third party, D, is introduced in Person A’s 
opening observation. So, for example, in the abusive, scientific argument, participants first 
saw this opening claim in a dialogue between these three interlocuters: 
Person A – “I agree with him when he says that you have acted extremely unethically, 
you did not tell your patients in advance what they would be exposed to.” 
They were then asked to rate on a 7 point scale (from extremely unconvinced to extremely 
convinced), how convinced person A is by the third party’s (i.e., D, the referent of “ him” and 
“he”) argument. On the next screen, the dialogue continued, i.e., Person B now comments 
(Person A’s opening comment remains on screen):  
Person B – “What does he know about ethics? He is not a Doctor at all.” 
Participants where then asked to rate how convinced A would now be on the same scale. All 
participants provided two such ratings for all combinations of argument type and context in a 
2 (Rating: Prior vs. Posterior) × 3 (Context: Scientific vs. Political vs. Domestic) × 4 
(Argument Type: Control vs. Abusive vs. Tu Quoque vs. Circumstantial) completely within 
subjects design.  
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In these dialogues, Person A functions as the target of both D’s and B’s arguments, 
i.e., it is A whom they are both trying to persuade. As we argued in the introduction, the 
reason for constructing the arguments in this way was to try and divorce participants’ 
judgements as far as possible from their own prior beliefs by asking them to evaluate of how 
convinced the third party, A, is by the arguments they both witness.  
On completing the argument evaluation task, all participants also completed a ten 
item personality inventory (TIPI). We speculated that personality may affect how persuaded 
people were by the arguments. Contrary to the persuasion literature in social psychology, we 
found no effects of the big five personality traits on argumentation using the ad hominem. 
The rationale and results are discussed more fully in the Supplementary Materials: 
Personality. 
 
Analysis Strategy 
Given the experimental design, it could be asked why did we not analyse the data using a 
Bayesian version of a generalised linear model? The answer is straightforward: none of the 
predictions under test assume any direct linear relationship between degrees of belief and the 
independent variables of context and argument type.  
 A more involved issue concerns avoiding false alarms or Type 1 errors. In Bayesian 
analysis the possibility of false alarms can be mitigated by using prior knowledge about 
groups of parameters to define overarching distributions from which these parameters are 
drawn. For example, the prior precision, α + β, for all conditions might be assumed to be 
drawn from a common distribution as the same participants perform in each condition. 
Implementing this assumption in the descriptive model creates shrinkage in the parameter 
values toward the mean of the overarching distribution calculated over all the data (not just in 
one condition). We have not implemented such a scheme because our explanatory Bayesian 
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model allows that these parameters are highly content/context dependent, i.e., we would 
expect the means and precisions to vary between conditions. Figure 1 shows the descriptive 
hierarchical Bayesian model used to analyse the data. 
 
 
Figure 1. The hierarchical Bayesian model used in the descriptive model of the data. xijk = measured prior 
degree of belief, yijk = measured posterior degree of belief. The parameters of the Beta distribution are positive 
real numbers and consequently the priors over these parameters used an uninformative Gamma distribution. In 
running the MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) model, 3 chains were used with 10
3
 burn in steps and 10
5
 
saved steps with no thinning (Link & Eaton, 2012). The MCMC chains showed good mixing and auto-
correlations reduced to 0 for all parameters. The final posterior distributions were insensitive to variations in the 
prior. (For the MCMC chains, posterior distributions, and Lag-Autocorrelation graphs for each estimated 
parameter, see MCMC Diagnostics in the Supplemental Materials available on-line. These are for the 
explanatory model.)  
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Results 
The rating scale ranges from extremely unconvinced to convinced. It could be argued that this 
scale is ambiguous between anchoring the lower end at 0 (convinced not) and .5 uncertain. 
We therefore opted for the latter interpretation but we analysed the data using both rescaling 
methods and our results were not altered. Consequently, the ratings, x, on a 1 to 7 scale were 
converted to probabilities using the conversion (x + 5)/12. Extreme values of 1 were recoded 
as .999 to prevent division by zero in the Bayesian hierarchical modelling. The results of the 
argument evaluation task, with the ratings converted to probabilities, are shown in Figure 2 
showing the means of the relevant Beta distribution and the 95% highest density intervals 
(HDI) derived from the posterior parameter estimates. Figure 3 shows the Beta density 
functions for prior and posterior distributions for each condition with the parameter values 
and means. 
 
Figure 2. Means and 95% HDIs for the descriptive model by argument type and context derived from the 
posterior parameter estimates from the hierarchical Bayesian modelling exercise with 95% HDIs. 
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Figure 3. Prior and posterior Beta density functions for each context and argument type, showing the mean 
values and the parameter values for each distribution derived from the descriptive model. 
 
Priors  
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We first analysed the priors because three expressions were used to express A’s degree of 
belief after hearing D’s initial argument, “I think that…” (4), “I believe that…” (5), and “I 
agree that…” (3) (number in brackets = no. of times used). This analysis showed that believe 
seems to express a marginally stronger degree of belief in a proposition than think but not 
agree. The difference between believe and think is small and unlikely to affect our results 
(For results, see Appendix 1).   
 
Predictions 
We then tested the predictions of the epistemic/relevance approach. Argument force was 
indexed as the difference between the posterior and prior means in each condition, which we 
designate “Δμ.”6 All twelve of these differences showed large effect sizes. The smallest mean 
difference was for the abusive argument in the scientific context (mean prior = .86, mean 
posterior = .79), Δμ = .07 [.040, .101] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 4.53 [2.58, 6.5]).7 All other comparisons showed 
even greater effects. These results show that people are indeed highly sensitive to the 
epistemic relevance of evidence of bad character in everyday contexts, which explains why in 
the courtroom they find it so difficult to ignore inadmissible evidence even when directed to 
do so. 
Prediction 1. This prediction is that all the ad hominem arguments should lead to a 
smaller decrease in degree of belief than the control. The controls are cases where D’s bad 
character is directly relevant to the conclusion. Thus there should greater prior – posterior 
differences for the controls than for the ad hominem arguments. For each argument ad 
hominem we compared the average of the means over the three contexts with the same 
average for the control, e.g., control vs abusive:  Δ?̅? = (Δμ1 + Δμ 2 + Δμ 3)/3 – (Δμ 4 + Δμ 5 +Δμ 
                                                          
6
 The mean μ for each prior and posterior is α/(α + β), where α and β are the parameters of the relevant Beta 
distribution estimated from the data.  
7
 𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = mean effect size. For means and effect sizes, the numbers in square brackets show the 95% Highest 
Density Interval (HDI). Δμ (and Δ?̅?, see below) was approximately normally distributed for each comparison.  
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6)/3.
8 For all comparisons, zero was not a credible value for the difference. For the control 
(mean = 0.21) vs. abusive (mean = 0.10), Δ?̅? = .11 [0.09, 0.13] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 10.30 [8.30, 12.20]); 
for the control vs. tu quoque (mean = 0.138), Δ?̅? = 0.072 [0.051, 0.093] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 6.68 [4.71, 
6.97]); for the control vs. circumstantial (mean = 0.137),  Δ?̅? = 0.073 [0.054, 0.093] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 
7.27 [5.33, 9.26]). The control, where the evidence was directly relevant to the conclusion, 
led to a greater reduction in degree of belief than the ad hominem arguments, where the 
evidence was less directly relevant to the conclusion. Consequently, while our results show 
the same pattern as Van Eemeren et al (2008), pragmadialectical theory could not explain the 
result as the control cannot be identified with the argumentative stage where the freedom rule 
is not violated.  
It could be argued that these differences are primarily due to differences in the prior 
because floor effects are preventing the ad hominem arguments revealing their argumentative 
force. However, Figure 1’s y-axis has a range of 0.6 to 0.9, which obscures the fact that there 
was room at the floor of the scale (0.5) for participants to reveal reductions in degree of belief 
as large as the control. Moreover, if we compare argument strength, rather than force, by 
comparing the posterior means the control led to a lower mean posterior degree of belief than 
both the abusive (Δ?̅? = 0.068 [0.033, 0.082]; 𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 9.78 [7.83, 11.70]) and the tu quoque (Δ?̅? 
= 0.025 [0.012, 0.038]; 𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 3.74 [1.76, 5.67]), although not the circumstantial (Δ?̅? = 0.0002 
[-0.011, 0.012]; 𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 0.04 [-1.92, 1.98])  for which zero was a credible value. Consequently, 
except for the circumstantial, the results for argument strength replicated the results for 
argument force.  Moreover, for the circumstantial, there was sufficient room at the floor to 
reveal greater force if it possessed it.  
 Prediction 2. The pragmadialectical prediction of an ordering in argument force such 
that tu quoque > circumstantial > abusive fared less well. The circumstantial, Δ?̅? = 
                                                          
8
 We subscript parameters by position in Figure 3, 1 – 3 correspond to the first row, 4 – 6 the second and so on. 
So, for example, μ7 is the prior mean for the tu quoque/scientific argument. 
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0.036[0.015, 0.057] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 3.38 [1.43, 5.34]), and the tu quoque, Δ?̅? = 0.037 [0.015, 0.059] 
(𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 3.27 [1.33, 5.25]), were more forceful than the abusive. However, zero was a credible 
value for the difference between the circumstantial and the tu quoque, Δ?̅? = -0.001 [-0.022, 
0.020] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = -0.09 [-2.02, 1.88]). For argument force the complete ordering was 
circumstantial = tu quoque > abusive. This ordering is consistent with the relevance/epistemic 
prediction. As we saw in the introduction, conflicts of interest (circumstantial) and hypocrisy 
(tu quoque) are both highly relevant to an informant’s reliability as a source of information. 
However, the relevance/epistemic approach makes more nuanced predictions which modify 
the effect of ad hominem type by the context of the argument. 
 Prediction 3.  The pragmadialectical prediction that ad hominem arguments would be 
less forceful in a scientific context was only partially confirmed. For science (mean = 0.13) 
vs political (mean = 0.17),  Δ?̅? = 0.066 [0.045, 0.088] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 6.03 [4.12, 8.03]), but for 
science vs domestic (mean = 0.09), Δ?̅? = -0.014 [-0.036, 0.008] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = -1.22 [-3.18, 0.74]). 
For the last comparison, zero was a credible value for the difference. In sum, the use of an ad 
hominem argument was regarded as less forceful in a scientific context than in the political 
but not the domestic contexts. The relevance/epistemic approach makes more nuanced 
predictions (3' and 3''). 
Prediction 3', that the tu quoque, implying hypocrisy, is more relevant in the political 
context than the abusive or circumstantial was confirmed. In this context, the tu quoque 
(mean = .24) was more forceful than the abusive (mean = .14),  Δ?̅? = 0.10 [0.068, 0.137] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  
= 5.85 [3.86, 7.78]) and the circumstantial (mean = 0.14), Δ?̅? = 0.11 [0.072, 0.139] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 
6.10 [4.13, 8.04]). Prediction 3'', that the circumstantial, implying a conflict of interest, is 
more relevant in the scientific context than the abusive or tu quoque was also confirmed. In 
this context, the circumstantial (mean = .17) was more forceful than the abusive (mean = .07),  
Δ?̅? = 0.10 [0.056, 0.134] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 4.81 [2.83, 6.73]) and the tu quoque (mean = 0.09), Δ?̅? = 
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0.08 [0.040, 0.117] (𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 3.96 [2.00, 5.92]). It seems that when considering their effects on 
people’s degrees of belief there is a more complex relationship between context and ad 
hominem argument type than considered in van Eemeren et al (2009) but one which makes 
intuitive sense in terms of relevance to the reliability of the source.  
 
A Bayesian Conjugate Prior Model 
The explanatory model we propose is itself Bayesian. The two ratings collected for each 
argument are participants’ evaluations of (i) interlocuter A’s prior degree of belief before 
hearing interlocuter B’s argument and (ii) the posterior degree of belief Person A now has in 
the conclusion after hearing the argument. Our descriptive model computed the parameters of 
separate Beta distributions for these two variables for each of the 3 × 4 cells of the design 
without any assumption that they were related as prior to posterior distributions.
9
 Our 
explanatory model incorporates this assumption and modifies the model to incorporate 
further assumptions relevant to modelling argumentation. 
The Beta distribution is a conjugate prior and so the posterior is also a Beta 
distribution, Beta(α + α1, β+ β1), with altered shape parameters dependent on the likelihood. 
The likelihood function for a Beta conjugate prior is the Bernoulli distribution. Consequently, 
α and β correspond to the number of successes and failures respectively or, in terms of 
argumentation, the amount of evidence for (α) and against (β) a conclusion. For example, A’s 
initial degree of belief might be quite high at say .8, which would correspond to an expected 
value of, for example, a Beta(4, 1) distribution because the mean of this distribution is α/(α + 
β). Confidence or precision, i.e., α + β, is low. After hearing B, A revises her degree of belief, 
to .5, i.e., she is now completely uncertain, which corresponds to the posterior, for example, 
Beta(4, 4). That is, they may be uncertain but they are confident of their uncertainty. In this 
                                                          
9
 The priors updated in the hierarchical Bayesian model were Gamma priors for each α and β parameter 
providing posterior estimates of each parameter given the experimental data. 
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example, notice that only the β parameter is updated. This is because the argument only 
provides evidence against the conclusion and none for the conclusion. Consequently, given 
the prior distribution Beta(α, β) the posterior distribution will be Beta(α, β+ β1). This 
parameterization contrasts with the descriptive model in which the parameters of these 
distributions were not constrained in this way.  
In terms of argumentation, the model implies that B’s ad hominem argument has a 
cumulative effect on judgements of what A should believe. The argument provides additional 
evidence against the conclusion. This approach has the consequence that people should be 
more confident, i.e., precision (α + β) should be higher, after hearing the argument. This can 
be seen in Figure 3 where the precision (α + β) for the prior and posterior can be directly 
compared. There is one exception, the abusive ad hominem in the scientific context. Fitting 
the model to the data suggests that this is probably an outlier. This finding argues against an 
evidence retraction model of the ad hominem. In such a model the positive evidence for the 
conclusion provided by A’s initial informant D, is retracted, that is, the new posterior would 
go back to Beta(1, 1). Bayesian updating cannot account for retraction of evidence of this sort 
(see, Kelly & Glymour, 2003).
10
 Because we first fitted the full descriptive model we can 
discount this possibility.  
This Bayesian conjugate prior model implies that people represent probabilities as 
distributions so that they simultaneously represent their confidence, i.e., precision (α + β) or 
more generally the variance, in the expected value, α/(α + β). It is unlikely that probabilities 
are represented cognitively or neurally as point values and accounts of neural computation 
assume a distributional approach (Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2006; Knill & Pouget, 2004). 
Moreover, the parameters of the Beta distribution are interpreted as amounts of evidence, 
                                                          
10
 The fact that retraction does occur in the court room, in science, and in everyday life points to a possible 
limitation of the Bayesian approach. In practical implementations (e.g., HUGIN [Madsen, Jensen, & Kjærulff, 
2005]) retraction of evidence can occur but this must be done by the user outside the actual Bayesian inference 
system itself.   
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perhaps counts or weighted counts, for (α) and against (β) the conclusion determined by A’s 
initial statement (“I agree..”) and by the argument. These processes are individual 
psychological processes. However, in the descriptive model used to test our hypotheses we 
calculated the posterior parameter values at the group level. In part, this was a practical 
choice: there was not sufficient data to support fitting to individual results. However, there is 
a theoretical rationale. This strategy has a psychological interpretation in terms of the 
explanatory model. In the absence of data on individual precisions, we assume that each 
participant’s probability judgements are made by taking a very small sample, perhaps only 
one, from the same underlying distribution. The best estimate of the mean and variance (or 
precision, α + β) of this distribution will therefore be given at the group level, i.e., at the level 
at which we would normally estimate the variance of any measured random variable. 
Similarly, we analysed the explanatory model at the same level. 
 
Figure 4. Means and 95% HDIs for the explanatory model by argument type and context derived from the 
posterior parameter estimates from the hierarchical Bayesian modelling exercise with 95% HDIs. 
 
To fit the explanatory model to the data we used the same hierarchical Bayesian 
modelling procedure as we did for the descriptive model. That is, we estimated the posterior 
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parameters of the new model in which the prior is distributed as Beta(α, β) and the posterior 
as Beta(α, β+ β1). In this model, β1 can be regarded as a directly estimated index of argument 
force. As opposed to the 48 free parameters of the descriptive model, the explanatory model 
had only 36 free parameters. Figure 4 shows the fit of the model to the data. Qualitatively, the 
model seems to provide almost as good a fit as the full descriptive model but with fewer 
parameters. We quantitatively assessed the fits using the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) which penalises models for the number of parameters and is directly related to the 
marginal likelihood of the data given the model (Schwarz, 1978).
11
 A better fit is indicated by 
lower values of the BIC. BIC for the descriptive model was 54.27 and for the explanatory 
model it was 16.13. Because of the relation to the marginal likelihood, the Bayes factor—the 
ratio of marginal likelihoods for each model—can be approximated as 𝑒𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑖−𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑗 (Kass & 
Raferty, 1995). The Bayes factor shows that the explanatory model with 12 fewer parameters 
was far more likely to have generated the data than the full descriptive model (𝑒38.14 is a very 
large number).
12
  
 We also used the directly estimated index of argument force, i.e., β1, as the dependent 
variable to assess Predictions 1 to 3. These analyses largely replicated our results using the 
descriptive model. There were some inconsequential differences for the priors but the only 
substantive change was for Prediction 2. The ordering in argument force was circumstantial > 
tu quoque = abusive rather than circumstantial = tu quoque > abusive.  The explanatory 
model exaggerates the differences for the tu quoque. However, the primary prediction of the 
relevance/epistemic account were the more nuanced predictions concerning the relevance of 
the tu quoque in political contexts and the relevance of the circumstantial in the scientific 
context. Both of these predictions were replicated using β1 as the dependent variable. 
                                                          
11
 Where the errors are normal and independent and identically distributed BIC = 𝑛. ln(𝜎𝑒2̂) + 𝑘. ln(𝑛) where n = 
number of observations, k is the number of parameters and 𝜎𝑒2̂ is the error variance. To calculate error variances 
the deviations between both models’ predictions and the empirical means were used to calculate mean squared 
errors. 
12
 This suggests that the result for the abusive ad hominem in the scientific context was indeed an outlier. 
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Discussion 
We began this paper by considering what happens when a lawyer violates the rules of 
evidence by pointing out a witness’ previous bad character. Consistent with the results on 
disregarding inadmissible evidence (Steblay, et al., 2006), we suggested that even if the 
violation is pointed out by the judge, people will nonetheless tend to discount the testimony 
and so lower their degree of belief in the conclusion it is intended to support. This intuition 
runs counter to procedural approaches which suggest that dialogical rules like the rules of 
evidence are part of our cognitive resources for evaluating every day arguments. These rules 
may be violated at different stages in an argumentative dialogue. With respect to the ad 
hominem argument, the evidence for this position derives from experiments using 
reasonableness as a dependent measure. As we noted, this is actually a binary concept but 
Van Eemeren et al. (2009) observed graded effects. Moreover, the manipulation of the stage 
of the argument was confounded with epistemic relevance (Walton, 2008; Hahn & Oaksford, 
2007, 2012). As we pointed out, relevance comes first and procedural rules in formal contexts 
are there to ensure that only evidence relevant to the particular stage in the proceedings is 
heard. We therefore replicated Van Eemeren et al.’s (2009) experiment using a graded belief 
change paradigm with a control with no manipulation of the stage of the argument which was 
compared with three forms of the ad hominem. The ad hominem arguments all lead to very 
large changes in degrees of belief although smaller than in the control where the evidence 
was directly relevant to the conclusion. The differences between the control and the ad 
hominem arguments could not be explained by the pragmadialectical approach as there was 
no manipulation of the stage of the argument. These results confirmed our conjecture that in 
everyday argumentation people are highly sensitive to the relevance of information that can 
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discount somebody’s testimony. This is why it is difficult to ignore evidence in the formal 
setting of the court room even when directed to do so by the judge.  
There is a paucity of experimental research on the fallacies of informal 
argumentation. As we have seen, the reasons for when these “fallacies” are acceptable and 
when they are not have important consequences for real world contexts like the admissibility 
of evidence in the courtroom. Previous work on the ad hominem has not examined the 
different forms of the argument or sought to fully contrast different theoretical approaches 
(Harris, Hsu, & Madsen, 2012; Oaksford & Hahn , 2013). People’s sensitivity to epistemic 
relevance, as revealed by these experiments, is a general manifestation of our need to 
distinguish good testimony from bad. In a world where most of our knowledge is derived 
from testimony from sources of differing reliability (Harris, 2012) people need to be sensitive 
to arguments like the ad hominem that question the reliability of these sources and to the 
contexts in which they are most effective.  
   We modelled the results using a Bayesian conjugate prior model which was a simple 
extension of the descriptive model we used to analyse our results. The model suggests that 
people represent their degrees of belief as probability distributions as in the Bayesian brain 
hypothesis (e.g., Doya et al, 2006). It also implies that the ad hominem argument has a 
cumulative effect suggesting further negative evidence against a conclusion. This model 
provided good fits to the data. It is a distinct advantage of the epistemic approach that it can 
provide quantitative models of the degree to which people should change their degrees of 
belief in response to an argument. Further research will need to examine ways of 
incorporating retraction into the model and ways of collecting data for parameter free fits 
(i.e., collecting estimates of parameter values).  
 We have proposed an integrative theory taking into account relevance and epistemic 
approaches. However, this does not mean that procedural rules are irrelevant in everyday 
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contexts. By assuming that rules similar to those found in formal settings like the courtroom 
generalise to every argumentation, the pragmadialetical approach seems to put the dialogical 
cart before the relevance horse. Nonetheless, there is probably a smooth continuum between 
informal everyday contexts and formal contexts. For example, as the number of people 
involved in an argument increase more formal procedural rules may be transacted to guide 
the ongoing discussion. It is conceivable that rules preventing proposals being rejected by ad 
hominem attacks could evolve in such a context. This scenario would be consistent with 
recent arguments that group reasoning may potentially de-bias human reasoning (Mercier & 
Sperber, 2011). Consequently, we would envisage an integrative approach incorporating 
some aspect of procedural rules. Other integrative approaches are being pursued in the 
computational/artificial intelligence literature, which have not yet been explored empirically 
(e.g., Paglieri & Castelfranchi, 2006). 
 These results provide support for a broadly Bayesian approach to the psychology of 
reasoning (Elqayam & Over, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2001, 2007, 2009; Over, 2009). 
Participants do not respond with simple binary judgements, rather their beliefs show graded 
change. These effects are appropriately measured by the Bayesian distinction between 
argument strength, the degree of belief bought about by an argument, and argument force, 
which can be measured by the likelihood ratio. Argument force has also been appealed to in 
accounting for the conjunction fallacy (Tentori, Crupi, & Russo, 2013) and Rips (2001, p. 
129, foonote 1) has also argued for the importance of an appropriate measure of change 
between prior and posterior. In our explanatory model, this is the quantity indexed by β1. 
In conclusion, we suggested that in the courtroom people will revise their degrees of 
belief given evidence of bad character even when directed not to by the judge because in 
everyday argumentation they regard this information to be highly relevant. Our experiment 
confirmed this conjecture and produced results that could not be explained by the 
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pragmadialectical approach. Continued empirical research into everyday argument may also 
inform our understanding of how to get jurors to accept judicial direction.  
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Appendix 1: Priors 
We looked at people’s prior degrees of belief by comparing the values of the parameters 
sampled from the MCMC chains. Our primary reason to look at the priors was that three 
expressions were used to express A’s degree of belief after hearing D’s initial argument, “I 
think that…” (4), “I believe that…” (5), and “I agree that…” (3) (number in brackets = no. of 
times used). In Figure 3, we show the actual prior and posterior Beta distributions and 
parameter values for each argument and context for the descriptive model. We subscript 
parameters by position in Figure 3, 1 – 3 correspond to the first row, 4 – 6 the second and so 
on. So, for example, μ7 is the prior mean for tu quoque/scientific argument, where μ = α/(α + 
β). We then calculated the average of the mean values for each expression and examined the 
posterior distribution of the three differences between expressions, e.g., believe vs. think: (μ1 
+ μ2 + μ5 + μ7 + μ11)/5 – (μ3 + μ6  + μ9  + μ12)/4. For think (mean = .855) vs. agree (mean = 
.855), zero was a credible value for the difference (Δ?̅? = 0.0003 [-0.014, 0.015]; 𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 0.005 
[-1.91, 2.01]; Δ?̅? = mean difference, 𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = mean effect size, [ ] = 95% HDI). For believe 
(mean = .868) vs. agree zero was also a credible value for the difference (Δ?̅? = 0.013 [-
0.001, 0.027]; 𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 1.83 [0.16, 3.76]). For believe vs. think there was a marginal effect (Δ?̅? = 
0.013 [0.00006, 0.027]; 𝐸𝑆̅̅̅̅  = 1.94 [0.009, 3.93]). This analysis shows that believe seems to 
express a marginally stronger degree of belief in a proposition than think but not agree. The 
difference between believe and think is small and unlikely to affect our results. First, the three 
expressions were equally divided between the three ad hominem arguments. Second, we are 
primarily concerned with prior—post differences as an index of argument force. Perhaps the 
only concern is that two believe expressions were used in the control condition, which could 
lead to greater prior—post differences. However, one instance of believe in the control only 
led to a similar prior degree of belief as agree for the tu quoque.   
 
